Molineux Consolidated Accounts - Trust Review
This week the Wolverhampton Wanderers holding company W.W. (1990) Ltd issued its consolidated annual report and financial statement for the period ended 30th June 2025.
The holding company own both Wolverhampton Wanderers (1986) Ltd (the football club) and Wolverhampton Wanderers Properties Ltd (Molineux and the training ground).
In turn, the holding company is owned by Enormous Victory SARL (Registered in Luxembourg), which is ultimately owned by Fosun Group. If this sounds complicated – it’s because it is!
The accounting period for the holding company has been extended to 13 months so that going forward the club will be aligned with the accounting periods now established widely across other Premier League clubs. The new phasing also reflects contracts established with players and coaching staff.
So, what do the accounts look like?
The annual report and financial statement consist of several sections – strategic report, directors' report, directors’ responsibilities report, auditors’ report and financial statement. We have reviewed each section and provide our comments below on the key sections in the context of our ‘Manifesto for Change’ document issued and discussed with the senior executives at the club. As a reminder, the Manifesto lists a number of changes we think need to be made at the club in order for us to refresh and rebuild the strategic direction of the club.
It is important to state at this point that although we are not financial auditors, we do recognise and understand the formatting of consolidated annual accounts.
We also recognise that a football club has multiple stakeholders, not least the fan base, and as such we expect that consolidated annual accounts will be transparent and written in a manner that the club’s key stakeholders – us fans - can readily review and understand.
Our analysis of the key sections:
The strategic report
1. Strategic review - No mention is made of the strategic review that Nathan Shi committed to deliver upon his appointment and during meetings with the FAB, Trust and Fan Groups. We would expect to see this disclosed, particularly with the change of Director during the period.
2. Future developments - The annual report states ‘future developments have been disclosed as part of the Strategic Report’. A review of the strategic report highlights very little regarding ‘future developments’ and makes no mention of the very real risk of relegation (as at the date of the report).
3. Ownership - The report refers to the ownership of the Holding Company (referred to as the group) by Enormous Victory S.A.R.L and the line of ownership leading to Fosun International Limited. We believe the club should provide greater clarity of the club’s ownership chain in the light of concerns already raised about overall governance. It would make it easier to see who is accountable for what decisions – and if there’s nothing to hide, that should be in the best interests of us all.
4. Stadium and training ground development – supporters might expect some mention of future stadium development, alongside ongoing maintenance. The strategic review makes no mention of plans in this regard. We would expect liability in respect of the stadium and training ground to be considered as a financial risk that would be noted in an annual report, with details of the budgeting methodology to cover ongoing maintenance of both. This isn’t apparent in the accounts.
5. Long term planning – the Strategic Report focuses on a review of past performance, one that shows consistent operational losses. There is little content that outlines a strategic plan to overcome this loss-making position and secure a sustainable future for the club, whilst being competitive on the pitch. Club executives have told us that a strategic review IS taking place, and we look forward to being consulted on it in due course. In next year’s accounts, we’d expect to see the progress made against some of the key performance indicators or targets recorded and revealed – so that we can all see that we’re heading in the right direction.
6. Wolves Women – the accounts disclose that funding for the Women’s team amounted to £0.4M, it should be noted that our understanding is that this is for all staff and age groups including the women's first team where direct rivals in that period were spending £1M plus. We would expect to see more detail about the commitment to the women's team at this point.
The Directors’ report.
1. Governance – the Holding Company lists one director – Nathan Shi. Whilst this is lawful under the UK Companies Act 2006, it lacks the necessary ‘checks and balances’ that a multiple-director board would bring. Research shows that boards with a blend of voices, perspectives and expertise outperform those which do not.
2. We note the football club (Wolverhampton Wanderers (1986) Ltd) has two non-executive directors, but the nature of their appointment is such that their influence in the decision-making process is limited to footballing matters only. The existing position is not ideal it suggests that key decisions are being referred upwards into the ownership group (Fosun Group – Guo Guanchang) rather than through a robust review and decision-making process within the club.
3. Supporters – whilst the club makes extensive reference to the existing fan engagement channels at the date of the report, we would note that a subsequent commitment has been made to a review of the club’s Fan Engagement processes and that this is now underway through consultation meetings with the FAB and Trust. If we can work together to improve this process, it will make a real difference for fans and for the club.
4. Safeguarding – whilst the report reveals actions in respect of safeguarding, we have highlighted to the club that there should be safeguarding policies established for members of the FAB and Fan Focus Groups.
5. Suppliers – the club have outsourced both ticketing (Ticketmaster), merchandise (Levy Merchandising) and catering/hospitality (Levy UK). All three elements have a significant impact on supporters – on everything from the choice of beer to the quality of kits. We would expect the annual report to identify key suppliers and provide commentary on how that performance is monitored and audited, including user surveys.
6. Community – the report refers to Wolves Foundation as its charitable arm. This is commendable and the report should also acknowledge that Wolves Foundation are fully independent of the club with multiple funding sources. The report makes no reference to the financial risk that may exist to the Foundation through the loss of Premier League funding streams. It would be helpful and transparent to do so.
7. Environment – we welcome the disclosure of greater detail in respect of environmental impact. We would challenge the club to go further and report benchmarking metrics (emissions per match, fan, £ revenue and seat capacity) and make a commitment to report in line with the Premier League framework. We acknowledge that there does not currently exist a unified reporting standard for football clubs but suggest more visibility is achievable through establishing normalised benchmarking metrics.
8. Director resignation – the resignation of Jeff Shi is highly significant in respect of a single director organisation. The report makes little comment in this regard, denying its key stakeholder’s transparency around the process undertaken, both in respect of termination and recruitment. Jeff Shi enjoyed significant renumeration in his role of CEO and the report makes no reference to the cost impact of contract termination. The club might argue that these matters are private and confidential but the lack of any information about how this key transition was made creates a vacuum for supporters to fill.
Financial Statement
As stated above we are not forensic accountants, and we note that the loss-making position of the club is not dissimilar to the majority of clubs, not only in the Premier League, but throughout the professional football pyramid (men and women). We support the establishment of an independent regulator to address the question of financial sustainability – although we all want success on the field, we don’t want it to come at the price of the future of the club.
Across the football pyramid, however, owners of football clubs appear intent on risk-based investment to achieve a level of short-term success with a general disregard for the long-term sustainability of our football community, at all levels of the game. Like all good trusts, the Wolves 1877 Trust is concerned not just with Wolves but with the health of football up and down the pyramid. We all rely upon one another to prosper and it’s important to us that clubs are making decisions which factor in the long-term health of football – from our school fields to our national team.
1. The finances of the club are heavily dependent upon Premier League participation and broadcasting fees. Total turnover is stated as £171,975,000.00 of which over 70% is generated through broadcasting.
2. Gate receipts are detailed as £21,766,000, with an average attendance listed as 30,881. In simplistic terms this equates to a revenue of circa £705.00 for each attendee.
3. Player trading – during the period the club generated £117M through player trading although this position is masked by the extended trading period in which the sales of Cunha and Ait-Nouri took place. The strategy around player trading has been questioned by the Trust as it appears to be one that is based on attracting players to the club on the promise of ‘do well and secure a big club move’. This short-termism has resulted in the loss of key players and increasingly a gamble on unproven players. What’s more, it’s likely to result in the loss of our Premier League status this season. It is a core strategic approach taken by the club owners; a more sustainable strategy is required based on long-term squad development.
4. Capital investment – this is a cause for concern, with less than 5% of the club’s revenue being spent on tangible fixed assets (stadium and training ground). The financial statements show limited evidence of meaningful capital investment in stadium, training, or academy infrastructure. Depreciation of existing assets appears to outpace new investment, in short, the club is maintaining rather than enhancing its fixed asset base.
Financial resources are significantly directed toward player investment, indicating a short-term performance focus rather than long-term infrastructure development. This short-term policy means that the legacy of the Premier League seasons will show little or no progress in delivering long term financial sustainability (increased match day revenue streams).
Summary.
When Fosun purchased Wolves, they talked about doing things differently to compete with bigger Premier League clubs, this was initially borne out through player trading that delivered the purchase of rising stars. However, the club’s footballing decline has been built on following the business model of many other mid-table Premier League clubs, player trading, buying low, selling high. Wolves’ relegation is because of this failed strategic direction that lacks vision, we await the fulfilment of the ‘action not words’ commitment made through the FAB, Fan Groups and Trust meetings with the club.
This financial report, written through the lens of ‘rose tinted glasses’ only confirms what we already know the club has lost its course and direction, Nathan Shi has made encouraging statements, we will do all we can as a supporters’ trust to ensure that those words manifest themselves into tangible strategic changes.